APL demands review of GoldBod’s pricing model over $1.7bn gold trading losses
The Africa Policy Lens (APL) has called for an immediate and comprehensive review of the Ghana Gold Board’s (GoldBod) gold purchasing and pricing mechanism, following the disclosure of more than US$1.7 billion in gold-trading losses under government’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP).
In a press release dated August 26, 2026, APL said it had taken note of the losses contained in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) August 2026 Country Report on Ghana. According to the report, almost all of the losses were associated with purchases of gold doré.
GoldBod At Centre Of Transaction
While the IMF report records the losses under the Bank of Ghana’s DGPP, APL notes that the Ghana Gold Board occupies a central role in Ghana’s gold purchasing and sourcing architecture. The IMF report indicates that GOLDBOD was responsible for sourcing operations in 2025 and relies on Sections 2 and 3(2) of the Ghana Gold Board Act to describe the Board as Ghana’s sole gold trader.APL argues the critical issue is not merely the institution on whose balance sheet the losses were recorded, but how those losses arose and the extent to which public funds were exposed.
Three Factors Behind Losses
According to APL, the IMF report attributed the losses to three major factors:
- Service and assay fees paid to the Ghana Gold Board;
- Discounts granted to off-takers/exporters; and
- The spread between the forex bureau rate used in purchasing gold and the cedi reference rate used for Bank of Ghana accounting purposes.
The report indicates that costs/losses associated with gold traded under the DGPP in 2025 amounted to approximately 17% of the value of the gold traded.
Based on reports reviewed by APL, service and assay fees paid to GOLDBOD together with discounts granted to off-takers accounted for approximately 1.78 percentage points, with the remainder attributed principally to foreign-exchange-related spreads.
APL says it is particularly concerned about the purchasing and pricing mechanisms through which gold was acquired and sold. It notes that Section 42(2) of the Ghana Gold Board Act places responsibility for gold off-take activities on GOLDBOD.
APL’s Observations
The think tank made the following observations, arguing GoldBod’s model must be part of any investigation:
1. Prior to the establishment of the Ghana Gold Board, licensed private gold dealers operating under the previous PMMC framework traded gold, paid applicable taxes and operated commercially.
2. Since its establishment in 2025, GOLDBOD has operated within a framework that gives it extensive powers over Ghana’s gold trade, including purchasing authority, tax privileges and state-backed financing, while also exercising significant regulatory responsibilities.
3. GOLDBOD has publicly positioned itself as an important source of foreign exchange for Ghana. Consequently, the costs and losses associated with foreign-exchange generation through its gold-purchasing operations require scrutiny.
4. Where significant quantities of artisanal and small-scale mining gold are purchased through a state-backed system with substantial purchasing powers and public financing, any reported losses amounting to approximately 17% of the value of the gold concerned demand an urgent review of the underlying purchasing and pricing model.
5. APL therefore believes that the issue should not be reduced simply to determining which institution’s balance sheet recorded the losses.
6. The IMF report further indicates that DGPP costs are expected to decline to 5% in 2026, after falling from a historical level of 14.5% to 11.4% in the first quarter of 2026. APL questions: What changes in the purchasing, pricing or operational structure account for the reduction from 14.5% toward the 5% target?
7. The draft contrasts Ghana’s 14.5% DGPP acquisition cost in 2025 with a World Gold Council illustrative artisanal and small-scale gold mining purchasing framework of 1.67%, based on figures attributed to the Bank of Ecuador. APL believes the substantial difference warrants further examination, while recognizing that any comparison should account for differences in market structure, methodology and operating conditions.
8. APL’s assessment therefore identifies GOLDBOD’s purchasing and pricing model as an area of significant potential risk within Ghana’s gold-trading architecture.
On that basis, APL believes that GOLDBOD’s role in the transactions and associated cost structure should form an integral part of any investigation into the reported losses, and calls for an immediate and comprehensive forensic examination of the model.
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